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I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 1985, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
first amendment protections outlined in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
do not apply to cases involving speech on purely private matters.2 In
so doing, the Court bypassed "[t]he issue debated in legal briefs and
in oral arguments-whether a non-media defendant had the same
First Amendment protections as media defendants."3 The Court re-
turned instead to the content-based analysis of Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc.4 The Rosenbloom plurality decision was supported by
a mere trio of Justices and was repudiated by a six-justice majority
less than three years later in the Gertz ruling.5
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.6 arose when the
credit-reporting company, Dun & Bradstreet, issued a false report to
five subscribers that Greenmoss Builders had filed a petition for
bankruptcy. Although a correction notice was issued to the subscrib-
ers, Greenmoss was not completely satisfied with the actions of Dun
& Bradstreet and brought suit for defamation in a Vermont state
court. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $50,000 com-
pensatory and $300,000 punitive damages which was upheld by the
1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
3. Denniston, The Supreme Court strikes off in a new direction in libel law, ex-
posing media and nonmedia defendants to greater risk, 6 CAL. LAW. 39 (Jan. 1986).
4. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Justice Brennan, in his dissent, stated:
Justice Powell's opinion in Dun & Bradstreet can be fairly read to support the
approach taken by the Rosenbloom plurality in deciding when and where the
Constitution should restrict state defamation law. The limits previously im-
posed, however, are less stringent than... under the approach of the Dun &
Bradstreet plurality opinion. Speech regarding matters of public or general in-
terest is to receive the minimal Gertz protections against unrestrained pre-
sumed or punitive damages instead of the full New York Times v. Sullivan
protections against any recovery, absent a showing of actual malice.
Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. Id. See also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
6. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
Vermont Supreme Court.7 Dun & Bradstreet petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari. When certiorari was granted,s it
appeared that a ruling was forthcoming on whether Gertz applied to
non-media defendants. However, the plurality decision stated that
the determinative factor was whether the speech involved a matter
of public interest or purely private concern.9
The ruling in Dun & Bradstreet has left attorneys and academi-
cians second-guessing the significance of the Court's holding. The
surprising result was that the Court's plurality opinion did not at-
tempt to apply Gertz.1O Some commentators suggested that this has
signaled a shift in the Court which could have such far-reaching im-
plications as a reconsideration of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan."1
Nonetheless, while Gertz remains intact, it is inapplicable to cases in-
volving private speech, such as Dun & Bradstreet.12 Furthermore,
the media-nonmedia distinction that appeared to be so important
before Dun & Bradstreet has now been rejected for a content-based
analysis similar to that in Rosenbloom,13 which proved extremely
problematic and was apparently overruled by Gertz. The severely di-
vided Dun & Bradstreet ruling14 points to one conclusion: now that
7. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414
(1983).
8. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 464 U.S. 959 (1983).
9. The long awaited decision was expected to resolve whether the
First Amendment limits on libel suits against news media were also available
to nonmedia defendants like Dun & Bradstreet. Although five different Jus-
tices went on record eschewing a media-nonmedia distinction and concluding
that the press enjoyed no greater protection than any other speaker under the
First Amendment, that position did not provide the common ground of deci-
sion, because four of the Justices were in dissent .... Instead, the Court...
held that the special limitations on excessive damage awards in defamation
suits did not apply in suits brought by private individuals or entities over de-
famatory statements on 'matters of purely private concern.'
Supreme Court Report, 71 A.B.A. J. 116, 123 (Nov. 1985).
10. "It is interesting to note that Justice Powell declines to follow the Gertz ap-
proach in this case. I had thought that the decision in Gertz was intended to reach
cases that involve any false statements of fact injurious to reputation." Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2952 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Floyd Abrams, the noted First Amendment advocate from New York City,
sees the ruling as the latest and strongest of several indications that Burger,
White, Rehnquist and O'Connor share 'a willingness to reconsider Sullivan it-
self. Anytime you are up to four Justices, you are talking about perilous
times.' And Jonathan Lubell, a New York City attorney who represents libel
plaintiffs, says he also perceives a shift on the court [sic]. 'There is much
more of an articulated minority for doing away with Sullivan entirely,' he
says.
Denniston, supra note 3, at 41.
12. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2946.
13. Id.
14. Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor. The Chief Justice filed a separate concurring opinion, as did Justice
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the Court has asserted its influence in the field of libel law, related
decisions will likely be forthcoming.15
This note begins by laying the necessary foundation, both legal and
factual, for a thorough understanding of the Supreme Court's opinion
in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 16 Next follows
an analysis of the four opinions filed in the case-the plurality opin-
ion, the two separate concurring opinions, and the dissenting opinion.
The note will conclude by examining the possible repercussions and
impact of the case on future libel cases.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL LIBEL LAW
The early common law of England imposed strict liability for libel,
as was the case with most tort causes of action. However, the courts
soon adopted the rule that a "plaintiff must plead and prove not only
that the defendant intended to defame him, but also that he was in-
spired by malice, [that is,] a desire to cause harm."1 7 This was an at-
tempt by the courts to discourage actions for defamation, both
slander and libel. Yet, by the nineteenth century, the English courts
were implying malice by law where a "statement was false and de-
famatory, and was made intentionally."' 8
As with other areas of the law, the early American courts adopted
the common law's basic principles concerning libel. To recover in a
White. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens.
15. At about the time the court [sic] issued its far-reaching opinion in Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders .. .it agreed to hear two other libel cases
next term which could have significant impact on the media. In Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, the court [sic] has been asked to decide how much evidence a
libel plaintiff must produce before trial to overcome a defense summary judg-
ment motion.
In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps the sole issue before the Court is
whether a plaintiff must prove that an allegedly libelous statement is false or
a libel defendant must prove the statement is true.
Libel & Privacy, 9 NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW 3, 3 (1985).
16. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
17. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1020
(7th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER].
18. Id. at 1021.
In 1825 the historic case of Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247, 107 Eng. Rep.
1051 (K.B.) was decided. It drew a distinction between 'malice in fact and
malice in law.' Malice is necessary, it held, but in the ordinary defamation
case, if the statement is false and defamatory and it was made intentionally,
'the law implies such malice as is necessary to maintain the action' .... [T]he
effect of the case was that malice in fact was no longer a requisite to a prima
facie case of defamation.
Id.
libel case, the rule developed that a plaintiff merely had to prove that
the defendant intentionally uttered a false statement about the plain-
tiff.19 However, the defendant could shift the burden of proof by as-
serting the affirmative defense of privilege, that is, truthfulness.2 0
Furthermore, the state courts had strict jurisdiction over libel law, in
spite of the first amendment freedom of speech and freedom of the
press guarantees. 21
The first half of the twentieth century saw the Supreme Court is-
sue opinions which allowed more freedom of discussion. The Court
first asserted its power to review state law in the area of libel and
freedom of speech in 1925,22 thereby eradicating the old view espous-
ing the inapplicability of first amendment constitutional protections
to state libel laws. By 1959, the Court had created libel law exclu-
sions for officials 23 and for the broadcast media,24 but on both occa-
sions had denied the privilege to members of the print media.
Finally, in 1964, the Supreme Court held in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan25 that a state cannot, under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, award damages to a public official for libel concerning his offi-
cial conduct absent a showing of "actual malice," which was defined
as either the knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the
truth.26 The decision was a first, in many respects, in American libel
law: it was the first time that the Court had used a due process analy-
sis to review a civil libel judgment; the first time that first amend-
ment protections had been extended to an editorial advertisement;
and, the first time that the Court had recognized that the Constitu-
tion protected defamatory and false statements.
The New York Times "actual malice" standard was extended be-
yond public officials to include public figures in Curtis Publishing Co.
19. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920) (book
publisher liable for publishing a supposedly fictional work which defamed a New York
City magistrate).
20. See, e.g., Kilian v. Doubleday & Co., 367 Pa. 117, 79 A.2d 657 (1951) (affirmative
defense to prove statements substantially true).
21. W. Prosser, supra note 17, at 1024.
22. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
23. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (overruled state law as
placing prior restraint on libels of public officials).
24. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am., N. Dakota Div. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S.
525 (1959) (state libel laws do not apply to equal-time statements over the electronic
media).
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court in New York Times stated that "[t]he constitu-
tional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice ......."Id. at 280. "We hold
today that the constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in ac-
tions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct." Id. at 283.
26. Id.
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v. Butts.27 Although the Court did not specifically define "public fig-
ure," it went to considerable effort to standardize the term as includ-
ing individuals who, by fame, position, or involvement in public
affairs, were influential in shaping issues of concern to the public.2 8
Four years after Curtis came the multifaceted and short-lived rul-
ing in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,29 wherein the New York
Times "knowing-or-reckless-disregard" standard was expanded be-
yond public officials and public figures to include any statement con-
cerning matters of public or general interest.30 It appeared that first
amendment protections of free speech and free press had been ex-
tended to the logical extreme, but the Court was sharply divided and
the decision rested on a tenuous plurality opinion written by Justice
Brennan, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
joined. Justice Black concurred in the judgment while adhering to
his view that the first amendment provides absolute immunity to the
news media. Justice White also concurred in the judgment, but only
because he viewed the facts such that the allegedly libelous state-
ment was covered by the New York Times rule. More importantly,
Justice White voiced strong opposition to the notion of expanding
that rule.31 In the dissenting opinion, Justices Harlan, Marshall, and
Stewart felt that a more stringent rule was not necessary, but pro-
posed that damages be limited to those actually incurred, excluding
27. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Although Curtis stands for the simple proposition that the
New York Times rule extends to "public figures," the case itself was not so simple. Ac-
tually, two cases were involved: (1) Coach Wally Butts of the University of Georgia
sued the Saturday Evening Post for charging him with "fixing" a football game, and
(2) Edwin A. Walker, a retired army general, sued the Associated Press for a story im-
plicating him in a racial disturbance at the University of Mississippi. Both were held
to be public figures. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Jus-
tices Clark, Fortas, and Stewart. This opinion established a different standard for pub-
lic figures, reversing Walker and affirming Butts. Chief Justice Warren wrote a
separate opinion arguing that the New York Times rule should apply, but concurred in
the judgment.
28. C. LAWHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL 56 (1981).
29. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
30. We thus hold that a libel action.., relating to ... involvement in an event
of public or general concern may be sustained only upon clear and convincing
proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 52.
31. I prefer at this juncture not to proceed on such a broad front. I am quite
sure that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was the wiser course, but I am una-
ware that state libel laws with respect to private citizens have proved a hazard
to the existence or operations of the communication industry in this country.
Id. at 60 (White, J., concurring).
punitive damages.3 2 Besides being the product of a fractured Court,
Rosenbloom was immediately plagued by lower court difficulties in
deciding what was a "matter of public concern"-it seemed that al-
most any publication or communication could qualify, given the
proper circumstances, and consequently courts were flooded with
litigation.33
The problematic Rosenbloom interpretation was addressed by the
Court in 1974 in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,34 where the Court
"granted certiorari to reconsider the extent of a publisher's constitu-
tional privilege against liability for defamation of a private citizen."3 5
The holding denied a publisher or broadcaster the first amendment
protections outlined in New York Times where the publication in-
volved defamatory falsehoods about an individual who was neither a
public official nor a public figure, even if the defamatory communica-
tion was of public or general interest.36 Thus, the Court not only put
the Rosenbloom rule to an early grave, but further held that the
states may not permit a recovery of presumed or punitive damages,
absent a showing of actual knowledge or reckless disregard. This de-
cision allowed private plaintiffs to recover only actual damages where
the New York Times test was not met.3 7 In disavowing the plurality
view of Rosenbloom, the Gertz Court had essentially adopted the dis-
senting opinions in Rosenbloom.
Significantly, one of the new members of the Court, Justice Pow-
ell, authored the Gertz opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist, another
new member. Also, it is worth noting that the fifth member of the
majority, Justice Blackmun, had been a member of the plurality in
Rosenbloom. What caused the shift? Justice Blackmun stated two
reasons in his separate concurring opinion: first, he felt that remov-
ing the possibility of presumed and punitive damages would leave
"sufficient and adequate breathing space" for the press; and second,
he realized that the division of the Court in Rosenbloom had led to
uncertainty and confusion, and he felt that it was important for the
Court to lay down a bright-line rule.38 Finally, the Court allowed the
states to determine the approprate standard of liability for a pub-
32. Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Within a year, for example, federal and state appellate courts applied the pub-
lic-issue standard to publications about individuals involved in electronic eavesdrop-
ping, gun fights, organized crime, sports, backpacking overseas, pollution control,
quality of restaurant food, service on private bus systems, suspension from school, sell-
ing liquor to minors, private divorce, published books, housing eviction, jail escapes,
political campaign work, and credit bureau practices. C. LAWHORNE, supra note 28, at
79.
34. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
35. Id. at 325.
36. Id. at 339-48.
37. Id. at 348-50.
38. Id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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lisher of libel in actions involving a private plaintiff, so long as the
states did not impose liability without fault.3 9
Of the four Justices in dissent, Justices Douglas and Brennan con-
cluded that the Constitution imposed greater restrictions on libel
suits, 40 while Chief Justice Burger and Justice White felt that the
Constitution imposed less stringent restrictions than those adopted in
Gertz.4 1
Even though the Gertz majority was established by Justice Black-
mun's reluctant vote, the holding proved to be stable and workable
over the next decade. However, the Court's opinion left unanswered
the question whether first amendment protections of free speech ap-
ply equally to media and non-media defendants. 42 Yet, a different
Court would decide this question; in 1975, John Paul Stevens re-
placed Potter Stewart, and Sandra Day O'Connor replaced William
0. Douglas in 1981. When the Court granted certiorari in Dun &
Bradstreet, it appeared that the media-nonmedia issue would finally
be resolved.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. Facts
On July 26, 1976, Dun & Bradstreet issued to five subscribers a
credit report which erroneously stated that Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
had declared bankruptcy. The error came to light that same day
while Greenmoss' president was at a local bank trying to secure a
loan. The bank officer informed him of a Dun & Bradstreet "special
notice" which stated that Greenmoss had filed a voluntary bank-
ruptcy petition.43
Greenmoss' president immediately contacted Dun & Bradstreet's
regional officer and explained that there had been an error, asked for
a correction, and also asked for the names of the firms that had re-
ceived the false report. Dun & Bradstreet agreed to look into the
matter, but refused to divulge the names of its subscribers, per com-
pany policy. After an investigation, Dun & Bradstreet concluded that
39. Id. at 347.
40. Id. at 355-68 (Douglas, J., Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 354-55 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 369-404 (White, J., dissenting).
42. A majority of the states declined to impose a requirement of knowledge or
reckless disregard in an action by a private person. However, at least three states-
Colorado, Indiana, and New York-required knowledge or reckless disregard in any
matter of public or general interest. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 1045.
43. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2941.
the report was indeed false. Dun & Bradstreet then issued a correc-
tive notice on August 3, 1976, eight days after the erroneous report
was circulated.44
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. is a moderately sized residential and com-
mercial building contractor located in Waitsfield, Vermont. It is a
Vermont corporation with no parent companies, subsidiaries, or
affiliates.45
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. is a New York based credit reporting
agency with a regional office in Manchester, New Hampshire. It pro-
vides financial information about businesses to its subscribers who
pay for the service. All information is confidential-subscribers are
not to reveal the information to others and Dun & Bradstreet has a
policy of not revealing the identity of its subscribers to outsiders.
The error in the report on Greenmoss' financial condition arose when
a seventeen-year-old high school student, employed by Dun & Brad-
street to review Vermont bankruptcy proceedings,46 had mistakenly
attributed to Greenmoss a bankruptcy petition filed by a former em-
ployee. Dun & Bradstreet failed to verify the information before cir-
culating the false report.47
B. Procedural History
Dissatisfied with Dun & Bradstreet's corrective action, Greenmoss
filed a libel lawsuit in the superior court of Washington, Vermont.48
The complaint alleged that the false report had been published with
reckless disregard for the truth and had damaged Greenmoss' busi-
ness reputation, resulting in loss of profits and requiring expendi-
tures to correct the error. In responding, Dun & Bradstreet asserted
44. Id. at 2941-42. Actually, there was some disagreement as to how long it took
Dun & Bradstreet to issue a correction. Greenmoss' statement of facts alleges that it
took eight days, from July 26 to August 3. However, Dun & Bradstreet contended that
the error was not reported until August 3 and that it issued a corrected report the
same day. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985)
(citing Brief for Respondent at 6). Also, the disagreement between the two parties was
not resolved by the corrective notice which stated that Greenmoss "continued in busi-
ness as usual." Besides contending that the notice was vague, Greenmoss insisted on
knowing the names of the five subscribers who had received the erroneous report.
When Dun & Bradstreet continued in its refusal to divulge the names, Greenmoss re-
fused to provide any further financial information, resulting in Dun & Bradstreet issu-
ing a '%lank rating" on the contractors. Dun & Bradstreet, 143 Vt. at 71-72, 461 A.2d at
416.
45. Brief for Respondent at 4; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
46. Prior to this controversy, the clerk of the U.S. District Court in Burlington,
Vermont had been Dun & Bradstreet's bankruptcy correspondent, but fearing a con-
flict of interest, he resigned. The clerk suggested as his replacement a sixteen-year-old
high school student whom he knew. She was hired without an interview for $200 per
year. Brief for Respondent at 7.
47. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2942.
48. Dun & Bradstreet, 143 Vt. at 69, 461 A.2d at 415.
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both common law and constitutional privileges because the report
had been issued in good faith. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
rendered a verdict in favor of Greenimoss and awarded $50,000 in
compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.49
Dun & Bradstreet petitioned the court for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issues of
liability and damages. The trial judge denied the motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, but granted the motion for a new
trial when he reviewed the jury instructions and concluded that they
incorrectly stated the standard of liability enunciated in Gertz.50
The Vermont Supreme Court heard the case on interlocutory order
to resolve five questions of law, all pertaining to the appropriateness
of the trial court's grant of a new trial based on the jury instruc-
tions. 51 The Vermont Supreme Court rejected Dun & Bradstreet's
claim to the media protections defined in Gertz and upheld the jury
verdict of the trial court. Further, the court held that Gertz was not
applicable to non-media defendants and that, while the jury instruc-
tions did not contain the Gertz standard, the instructions were never-
theless harmless error which did not require a new trial.52
Dun & Bradstreet petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari on the basis of the same issue it had presented to the Ver-
mont Supreme Court-that Gertz protections should extend to this
situation. Certiorari was granted on November 7, 1983,5 3 and oral ar-
gument was scheduled for March 21, 1984. In both petitioner's and
respondent's briefs, as well as those filed by amici, the Gertz issue
was treated as central to the case: do the first amendment protections
of free speech apply to non-media defendants in libel actions? Did
Greenmoss have to prove actual malice to recover punitive damages?
The Supreme Court, however, saw the issues differently, posing
49. Id.
50. Id. at 69-70, 461 A.2d at 415. The malice instruction to the jury read:
If you find that the Defendant acted in a bad faith towards the Plaintiff in
publishing the Erroneous Report, or that Defendant intended to injure the
Plaintiff in its business, or that it acted in a willful, wanton, or reckless disre-
gard of the rights and interests of the Plaintiff, the Defendant has acted mali-
ciously and the privilege is destroyed. Further, if the Report was made with
reckless disregard of the possible consequences, or if it was made with the
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, it
was made with malice.
Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2943 n.3.
51. Dun & Bradstreet, 143 Vt. at 70, 461 A.2d at 415.
52. Id. at 79, 461 A.2d at 421.
53. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 464 U.S. 959 (1983).
questions on whether the credit report was "commercial speech,"
which enjoys less protection than "political speech."54 Unable to
reach a decision before its term ended in July, the Court ordered the
case reargued and requested the parties to brief and argue two more
questions:5 5 whether the Gertz rule of punitive damages applied to
non-media defendants, and whether Gertz applied to libel where the
communication was "commercial speech." The first question ap-
peared to be only a variation of the issues presented at the former
argument. Nevertheless, with the issues thus defined, the case was
reargued on October 3, 1984.56
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Plurality Opinion
Authored by Justice Powell, and joined by Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor, the Court's opinion held that, although their decision per-
mitted recovery of presumed or punitive damages on a lesser showing
than "actual malice," there was no first amendment violation, be-
cause the first amendment protects only matters of public concern; a
credit report is a matter of purely private concern. For the first time,
Gertz was limited to cases involving public speech. Surprisingly, the
opinion failed to discuss both the media-nonmedia distinction and the
issue of commercial speech.
1. The jury instructions given by the trial court permitted a
recovery of presumed or punitive damages on a showing
of less than actual malice.
Greenmoss argued that a determination of whether Gertz applied
was not required to decide the case because the jury instructions did
indeed require the jury to find "actual malice" before awarding pre-
sumed or punitive damages. The Dun & Bradstreet opinion summa-
rily rejected this argument based on the trial court's broad use of the
terms "actual malice," "lack of good faith," and "malice" in its jury
instructions. This overbroad definition, the opinion said, would allow
54. Much of the Justices' questioning during oral argument focused on [coun-
sel for respondent] Heilmann's contention that the case should be treated as
one involving 'commercial speech' which enjoys less First Amendment protec-
tion than 'political speech.' About 10 minutes into Heilmann's argument, Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor asked: 'Well, in view of the development of the law
about commercial speech and the movement toward limiting it to advertising,
would it make sense to try to draw distinction between public speech or pri-
vate speech instead? '
It was the first time in the case anyone had suggested that the focus shift
away from the nature of the defendant to the content of the statement.
Denniston, supra note 3, at 40.
55. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 468 U.S. 1214 (1984).
56. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
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an award of presumed or punitive damages on a lesser showing than
the "actual malice" standard.5 7 Therefore, the Vermont Supreme
Court's holding that Gertz was inapplicable to the case was essential
in the decision to reverse the trial court's grant of a new trial. The
Court stated that it must decide, therefore, whether Gertz would in-
deed apply.58
2. When the libelous communication does not involve a matter of
public concern, it does not violate the first amendment to
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages
on a showing of less than actual malice.
The plurality opinion reviewed the three major libel decisions
before Gertz: New York Times, Curtis, and Metromedia. It then re-
viewed the reinterpreted Gertz, noting first that the New York Times
protections represented a balancing test between first amendment
concerns and the state's interest in protecting public persons from li-
bel.59 Further, the Court found that the state's interest in protecting
the average private individual from libelous publications was
stronger than the first amendment interest in protecting free speech.
Although Gertz held that the stronger state interest prevented puni-
tive or presumed damages absent "actual malice," nothing in that
case indicated that the same balance would be struck regardless of
the type of speech involved.60
Since the Court had never considered whether Gertz applied in the
context of purely private speech, it set out to balance the state's in-
terest against first amendment protections. The state's interest in
compensating plaintiffs for libel was found to be identical to that
found in Gertz-"strong and legitimate."S1 The first amendment in-
terest, however, was found to be weaker than in Gertz, for the speech
here involved a matter of purely private concern. While such speech
was not totally unprotected by the first amendment, its protections
57. The jury instructions defined malice as reckless disregard of possible conse-
quences, knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard of truth or falsity. Id. at 2943 n.3.
Gertz limited presumed and punitive damages to cases of knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard for the truth. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50.
58. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2943.
59. "These protections, we found, were not 'justified solely by reference to the in-
terest of the press and broadcast media in immunity from liability.' Rather, they rep-
resented 'an accommodation between [First Amendment] concern[s] and.the limited
state interest present in the context of libel actions brought by public persons.'" Id. at
2944 (citation omitted) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974)).
60. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2944.
61. Id. at 2945.
were held to be less stringent in Connick v. Myers.62 Based on the
"reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of pub-
lic concern," the Court held that an award of presumed or punitive
damages, absent "actual malice," was supported by the strong state
interest.63
3. The false credit report issued by Dun & Bradstreet did not
involve matters of public concern.
Again citing Connick v. Myers, the plurality stated that whether a
communication involves a matter of public concern is to be deter-
mined by the statement's "content, form, and context.., as revealed
by the whole record."64 The opinion then advanced three rationales
for why the particular communication in Dun & Bradstreet did not
involve any issue of public concern.
First, the Court stated that the speech was solely in the "individ-
ual" interest of Dun & Bradstreet and its specific audience. This type
of speech, the Court reasoned, warrants no special protection where
it is obviously false and damaging. 65 The plurality did not expound
on what it meant by "individual" interest or even how it concluded
that this speech was indeed only of import to Dun & Bradstreet.
However, in a footnote, it did eschew the hypothesis that this speech
was not of public interest because it was economic speech.66
Next, the plurality pointed out that the report had only been made
available to five subscribers who were not allowed to release the in-
formation to other parties. This type of credit reporting, Justice
Powell wrote, does not require special first amendment protection to
ensure open, robust debate on public issues, and therefore, the plu-
rality's holding would not prevent the free flow of commercial
information.67
Finally, the opinion reasoned that this type of speech, based solely
on economic incentive, is unlikely to be deterred by the prospect of
62. 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (assistant district attorney's communication about internal
office policies was not a matter of public concern so that employees' free speech rights
were not violated, barring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Greenmoss' attorney, Thomas
F. Heilmann, said that, in preparing the case, he discussed Connick with his colleagues
but decided that it "was irrelevant, and that the Court was more interested in drawing
'bright-line' distinctions between types of libel defendants, not categories of informa-
tion." Denniston, supra note 3, at 40. However, he did rely on a few short passages
from the case in his brief on the "commercial speech issue." Id.
63. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2946.
64. Id. at 2947 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
65. Id.
66. "We also do not hold, as the dissent suggests we do .... that the report is sub-
ject to reduced constitutional protection because it constitutes economic or commercial
speech." Id. at 2947 n.8.
67. Id. at 2947.
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higher damage awards in the case of a libel suit.6 8 Another incentive
for credit reporting companies to be accurate is that false reports will
cause reduced subscriptions-thus lowering profits-so that any
"chilling" effect on credit reporting due to this holding is likely to be
of "decreased significance." 69
B. The Concurring Opinions
1. Chief Justice Burger
In his opinion, the Chief Justice first emphasized the fact that he
had dissented in Gertz, stating that he would have preferred to let
the area of libel law concerning private citizens evolve along the lines
of pre-Gertz decisions. However, he asserted that until Gertz was spe-
cifically overruled, principles of stare decisis required that it be ap-
plied by the Court.70
The only issue, in Chief Justice Burger's view, was whether Gertz
applied to the instant case. Since he felt that Gertz was limited to
statements involving matters of public concern, he stated that it did
not apply here because the communication was one involving purely
private matters. In his opinion, this was sufficient to dispose of the
Dun & Bradstreet case. 71
More important than his reasons for concurrence in this case, how-
ever, were the Chief Justice's thoughts in regard to Gertz and New
York Times. Not surprisingly, he believed Gertz should be overruled.
More importantly, he believed that it was time to re-examine New
York Times, because "[t]he great rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment carry with them certain responsibilities as well."72
2. Justice White
The second concurring opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, authored by
68. Id. See also Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 (1976).
69. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2947. Although the plurality appears con-
vinced that the credit reporting was not a matter of public interest, lower federal
courts are split on the issue. See, e.g., Credit Bureau of Dalton, Inc., v. CBS News, 332
F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (practices of credit bureau are related to public interest);
Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (credit company re-
ports are not in the public interest).
70. Dun & Bradatreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice
Burger was not on the Court when New York Times or Curtis were decided. He joined
the plurality in Rosenbloom.
71. 105 S. Ct. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
72. Id.
Justice White, agreed with the plurality for either of two stated rea-
sons: First, Gertz should be overruled; or second, the defamatory pub-
lication did not concern a matter of public importance.73 As with
Chief Justice Burger's opinion, the significance of Justice White's
concurrence was his attitude regarding the New York Times and
Gertz decisions.
Although he joined the majority opinion in New York Times, Jus-
tice White now expressed a change of heart.74 He wrote that, in his
opinion, the rule had tipped the scales so far in favor of the press that
the free flow of information necessary to assess the performance of
our public officials had been polluted by false and misleading infor-
mation. Further, he proposed that the holding of New York Times
made it too difficult for a public plaintiff to clear his name of admit-
tedly false publications, since a public official's complaint must allege
and establish a prima facie case showing that the media defendant ac-
ted with knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth. The balance
between the first amendment and the rights of defamed individuals
struck in New York Times was considered by Justice White to be
void of reasonable foresight. Presumably, like the Chief Justice, he
would approve a re-examination of its principles.
Although Justice White, who had dissented in Gertz, wrote that he
would now like to see Gertz overruled, he admitted that he was sur-
prised at the plurality's failure to apply it in Dun & Bradstreet, stat-
ing that he thought it applied to any false statement that injures
reputation. 75 He also added that he agreed with the dissenters that
no distinction should be drawn between media and non-media de-
fendants-the first amendment protections of free speech and free
press are of equal force. 76
In the wake of the badly divided Dun & Bradstreet Court, Justice
White's opinion offered perhaps the most pragmatic look at balancing
the first amendment and state interests in libel suits when he dis-
cussed possible remedies. Instead of escalating the plaintiff's burden
of proof, which prevents a libel victim from clearing his name, Jus-
tice White argued that damages should be limited to a level that
73. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. 2953-54 (White, J., concurring).
74. The New York Times rule thus countenances two evils: first, the stream of
information about public officials and public affairs is polluted and often re-
mains polluted by false information; and second, the reputation and profes-
sional life of the defeated plaintiff may be destroyed by falsehood, that might
have been avoided with a reasonable effort to investigate the facts. In terms
of the First Amendment and reputational interest at stake, these seem grossly
perverse results.
Id. at 2951.
75. Id. at 2952-53 (White, J., concurring).
76. "[IThe First Amendment gives no more protection to the press in defamation
suits than it does to others exercising their freedom of speech." Id. at 2953 (White, J.,
concurring).
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would not threaten a free press. Presumed and punitive damages
could have been limited, or even forbidden, without the concomitant
increase in the plaintiff's burden of proof engendered by New York
Times and Gertz.77 Alternatively, a solution could have been reached
through legislation providing appropriate limits to damages; because
libel plaintiffs are more concerned with a clear reputation than a
monetary recovery, both sides would be in a better position.78
C. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan was joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Of the four, Justices Marshall and
Blackmun79 joined the majority opinion in Gertz, Justice Brennan
dissented, writing that Gertz prohibited the robust debate necessary
to protect first amendment freedom,80 and Justice Stevens was not
yet a member of the Court when Gertz was decided. The dissenters
reaffirmed their allegiance to the principles enunciated in New York
Times and Gertz, and framed the only issue in Dun & Bradstreet as
whether it was constitutional to allow presumed and punitive dam-
ages absent a showing of actual malice.81
1. The Gertz holding best accommodates the balance between free
speech and the states'8 2 interest in protecting reputation.
The dissenters began by asserting that all libel law implicates first
amendment protections because of the possible chilling effect on free
speech. Therefore, they argued, states must be careful to ensure the
adequate breathing space required to protect freedom of expression;
77. Id. at 2952 (White, J., concurring). It appears that Justice White approved of
the limitations on damages set out in Gertz, but not of the "actual malice" standard
which it perpetuated.
78. Justice White wrote that "[a] legislative solution to the damages problem
would also be appropriate." Id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring). In saying this he has
subtly proposed a return to common law principles which allow the individual states to
determine what the law will be.
79. Justice Blackmun concurred with the opinion of the majority only for the pur-
pose of establishing a bright-line test. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
80. "I cannot agree, however, that free and robust debate-so essential to the
proper functioning of our system of government-is permitted adequate 'breathing
space,' when, as the Court holds, the States may impose all but strict liability for defa-
mation ...... Gertz, 418 U.S. at 361 (citations omitted) (Brerman, J., dissenting).
81. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Interestingly, the plurality opinion referred to the "State's" interest while
Justice Brennan wrote of the "states'" interest. One possible interpretation of this is
that, unlike the plurality, the dissenters do not recognize any federal constitutional
interest in protection of reputation.
the availability of presumed and punitive damages awards in libel ac-
tions is inconsistent with these ideals.83
2. Gertz does not allow punitive damages absent a showing of
actual malice.
The dissenting opinion asserted that Gertz provides a definite nega-
tive answer to the central issue, whether the punitive damages award
in Dun & Bradstreet was constitutional.8 4 The respondent's conten-
tion of a media-nonmedia distinction was quickly rejected by the dis-
senters who suggested that the first amendment applies equally to
each citizen. Justice Brennan pointed out that, although the plural-
ity failed to address this issue, the remaining six Justices each em-
braced the view of the dissent on this matter.8 5
Next, the dissent attacked the plurality's reasoning in setting forth
a content-based analysis for libel cases. First, they pointed out that
the opinion of the Court established no guidelines for determining
what was and was not a matter of public concern, yet still managed
to determine that the speech at issue was not of public concern.8 6 By
reviewing the Court's own precedent, the dissenters concluded that
"[t]he credit reporting of Dun & Bradstreet falls within any reason-
able definition of 'public concern' . . . ,.87 Furthermore, by applying
the same balancing test as the plurality, the dissenters argued that
first amendment protections should apply in this case because the
subject matter of credit reporting directly implicated matters of pub-
lic concern.88 Finally, the dissenting opinion questioned the in-
creased protection provided a private plaintiff, when the plaintiff was
not an individual, but a corporation.89
83. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2955 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. [A]t least six Members of this Court (the four who join this opinion and
JUSTICE WHITE and THE CHIEF JUSTICE) agree today that, in the con-
text of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater or
no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in
the same activities.
Id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the opinion of the Court failed to ad-
dress the media-nonmedia issue, it will apparently be recognized now that first amend-
ment protections are equal for media and non-media defendants.
86. Id. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. It is worth noting in this regard that the common law of most states,
although apparently not of Vermont . . ., recognizes a qualified privilege for
reports like that at issue here .... The privilege typically precludes recovery
for false and defamatory credit information without a showing of bad faith or
malice, a standard of proof which is often defined according to the New York
Times formulation.
Id. at 2963 (citations omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2964 n.16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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V. IMPACT
A. Fffect on Prior Case Law
The holding in Dun & Bradstreet, although cutting into the protec-
tions of Gertz, did not overrule it. As a result, Gertz is now limited to
situations where the alleged libel involves a matter of public concern,
while the Dun & Bradstreet rule will cover cases involving a matter
of purely private concern.
In addition, it appears that the position of New York Times may
not be as secure as that of Gertz. The majority of the Court--Chief
Justice Burger, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and
O'Connor-has been appointed since the historic 1965 decision. Most
of them have expressed their dissatisfaction with the New York
Times rule.90 This, coupled with Justice White's change of heart
since he voted with the majority in New York Times, could spell
trouble for a holding which has been the backbone of American libel
law for over twenty years.
Floyd Abrams and Jonathan Lubell, libel attorneys in New York
City, see Dun & Bradstreet as the latest indication that Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor are willing to
reconsider New York Times.91 Conversely, Marc Franklin, Professor
of Law at Stanford University, considers the case "untouchable," and
John Cane, a libel defense attorney from Oakland, California, is of
the opinion that this particular alignment of Justices is "fleeting" and
that the case does not lend itself well to any conclusions.92 Nonethe-
less, the seeds of discontent have been sown.
B. Legal Ffects
The most obvious effect of the Court's holding is that damage
awards in libel suits involving purely private matters will be larger
and more easily obtainable due to the possibility of presumed and pu-
90. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White openly voiced their discontent in sepa-
rate concurring opinions in Dun & Bradstreet. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor could be considered at least partly at odds with New York Times, based on
their interpretation of it in Dun & Bradstreet. However, Justice Stevens remains
firmly in support of the Times rule.
91. Denniston, supra note 3, at 41. Speculation on the approach which newly ap-
pointed Justice Scalia will take is somewhat premature. However, it is likely that he
will join the new Chief Justice together with Justices White and O'Connor should the
opportunity for reconsideration arise in the near future.
92. Id. at 41-42.
nitive damages.93 "[A] private-figure libel plaintiff can collect ...
damages without proving that he or she suffered actual injury or that
the publisher was reckless or knew the statement was false."94
Although, as a general rule, a plurality opinion establishes no binding
precedent, five members of the Court did agree that it was permissi-
ble to award presumed or punitive damages on a lesser showing than
the Gertz actual malice standard. The plurality reached this conclu-
sion based on the purely private nature of the speech, while the
Chief Justice and Justice White concurred separately, stating their
feelings that Gertz should be overruled.
Also, media defendants should be prepared to litigate the issue of
public-private concerns in upcoming lawsuits.95 This could become a
serious problem for the press when it reports on the private lives of
public figures.96 Although the question was not addressed by the
Court in Dun & Bradstreet, most experts agree that the decision will
be held inapplicable to the media.97
Lower courts will also be affected by the Dun & Bradstreet holding
because the plurality opinion, while establishing a content-based
analysis of libel cases, failed to define what constitutes a "matter of
public concern." The only guideline provided by the opinion is a cita-
tion to Connick v. Myers98 which states that such determinations
must be based on the whole record. It can be inferred, therefore,
that the decision will be made by the trial judge since Connick states
that this is a decision of law, not fact.99 Yet, as history teaches, al-
most anything is likely to be treated as a matter of public concern by
the trial courts; that was the Rosenbloom lesson.100
C. Practical Effects
Will the Dun & Bradstreet decision have the undesirable effect of
"chilling" free speech? There could, at a minimum, be a temporary
93. Supreme Court Report, supra note 9, at 123.
94. Private Figures Standard Lowered, 9 NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW 3, 3 (Summer
1985).
95. Denniston, supra note 3, at 42.
96. By failing to apply Gertz to the Dun & Bradstreet case, the Court has, in effect,
created four categories of libel cases. A public figure/public issue case is covered by
the New York Times rule. A private figure/public issue case comes under Gertz. A
private figure/private issue case is now in the domain of Dun & Bradstreet. And the
public figure/private issue situation does not seem to be controlled by any of the three
scenarios. Until the Court rules on such a case, defendants going to trial under those
circumstances should be prepared to litigate the issue. The Supreme Court-Leading
Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 212, 217-19 (1985).
97. Denniston, supra note 3, at 42.
98. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2947 (citing Connick v. Myers 461 U.S. at 147-48
(1983)).
99. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7.
100. See supra note 33.
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"chilling effect" on the media, at least until the public/private figure
issue arises and is decided by the Court. G. Lee Garrett, Jr., attorney
for Dun & Bradstreet, thinks that the ruling will limit the media,
both in its coverage of private figures and of "limited-purpose" public
figures. 101 Floyd Abrams agrees that the decision will have the effect
of limiting the public-figure concept.102 However, depending on fu-
ture decisions of the Court, these ill effects could be diminished.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Court's holding in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss
Builders that Gertz does not apply to matters of purely private con-
cern is straightforward, the decision raises many questions. What can
justifiably be considered a matter of public concern? Will Gertz apply
to matters of private concern if the plaintiff is a public figure? Is the
Court shifting toward a reconsideration of the decision in New York
Times v. Sullivan?
Although answers to these questions must await future decisions,
one thing is certain. Now that the Court has left its mark in the area
of libel law and the first amendment, more decisions will be forth-
coming. The Court this term will rule on who has the burden of
proof of falsity and what the proper standard of evidence is to get a
libel case to trial. With those two issues decided, a much clearer pic-
ture of the Court's attitude toward libel law will come into focus.
JEFF BOYKIN
101. Denniston, supra note 3, at 42. A "limited-purpose" public figure is one recog-
nized as a public figure only for a limited time under certain circumstances. Id.
102. Id.

